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Abstract 
 
Within this project the reader will find a set of arguments both in favor of and against a basic income,                    
the former mostly stemming from the dutch philosopher, Philippe van Parijs, along with a thorough               
examination of subjectively picked parts of professional philosophers’ thoughts on the matter, such as              
those of Carole Pateman and Karl Widerquist amongst others. The aim is to remain as objective as                 
possible, yet it should be made clear to the reader that the authors of this paper all are in favor of the                      
idea. Thus, all anecdotal remarks have been removed and the reader should feel compelled to               
distinguish between argumentation and opinion. 
 
The discussion section later in the paper will contain several attempts to solidify vague or imprecise                
argumentation made by philosophers, and should be considered as attempts to iron out the general               
idea of a basic income. 
 
In the concluding part of the paper the reader will find that the attitude towards the UBI is unfazed for                    
the authors. The smaller experiments both with a UBI and similar projects all tend to conclude that                 
splitting up the reality of income for survival is motivating beyond expectations, and the case for a UBI                  
remains a strong one. 
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Preface 
 
The case for a UBI remains a relevant one, and increasingly so. In 2016 the Swiss will have a popular                    
initiative realised and have a vote on whether or not to implement a UBI. Both Finland and the                  
Netherlands are also having their public debates influenced by similar debates at higher political levels               
than one might think. 
 
Some view the basic income not as something that should be implemented, but has to be                
implemented. A study done by Oxford researchers suggests that 45 percent of US jobs will be                
automated within 20 years. Now, numbers like these are always hard to make tangible in the debate,                 
when we do not have a reference point - so let us find one. In the US there is an estimated 140 to 145                        
million jobs today. During the recession from 2008 to 2010 almost 10 million jobs were lost, and even                  
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though they were gained back, several economists have said that the depth of the fiscal failure in this                  
recession was greater than that of the infamous Wall Street crash in 1929. 
Let us return to our comparative look at these numbers now. If 45 percent of the 140 to 145                   
million jobs were lost that would equate almost 65 million jobs lost with slightly above 78 million jobs                  
left. Now, if a net loss of 10 million jobs is the worst slam dunk the economy has experienced                   
relatively, then how will the system handle a loss like 65 million? The study would have to be wrong                   
by a margin of almost 35 percent to even just be similar to the 2008 recession. Additionally, that                  
recession was marked by a rise in job creation directly after. Now in 2014 we are back to the same                    
level of jobs counted we had in 2007 before the dip. What would motivate us to understand                 
automation in a similar temporary fashion? 
 
Even if the numbers are wrong, and the study is falsified, it should be clear from this simple thought                   
experiment that our economy today is not geared towards handling the imminent rise of automation               
and its impact on the job market. In a world where the most precise surgeon is now a machine, and                    
the most reliable structural engineering is also done by a machine, we must ask ourselves the                
question: How optimally are we utilising the tools at our disposal? 
 
 
Problem area 
 
In the aftermath of the steady increase in unemployment following the most recent global financial               
crisis more and more attention is being shown towards alternative proposals to the capitalist model of                
the current socio-economic landscape. One such alternative proposal is the basic income model. This              
model assumes quite a different perspective on traditional issues, and thus it has compelled this work                
to produce a thorough examination of the concept. 
 
The Dutch philosopher Philippe van Parijs, whom this project will draw upon as its primary source,                
defines the basic income in the following way: “A basic income is an income paid by a political                  
community to all its members on an individual basis, without means test or work requirement” (Parijs                
2000:3). The concept of basic income will henceforth be known as UBI. This means that contrary to                 
the current model, where any income paid by a political community is policed and means tested, the                 
UBI would be instituted as a minimum income. According to van Parijs the incentive of profit of the                  
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current market paradigm can be separated from the incentive of survival effectively. What this implies               
is that currently survival and the reality of having your basic needs covered is linked directly to the                  
individual having a place in the job market. The introduction of UBI would remove from the equation                 
the aspect of requiring a job to survive independently. Furthermore Parijs’ argumentation extends             
into a review of the profit incentive. Well-being in society is often created without affiliation to                
payment such as art, community engagement, and taking care of family. However, this effort is not                
being rewarded or taken into account under a means-tested scheme, because the system is rigged to                
see only the transactions involving payment. By a UBI, such efforts would be a part of the reason                  
behind the scheme, seeking to support people in willful engagement without profit as a part of it. 
 
The aim of this project will be to understand the foundational principles that are being juxtaposed by                 
the introduction of the UBI. One example could be that in the current capitalistic paradigm people of                 
the working age, who are capable, should contribute in some capacity. This gives rise to               
means-testing, when the political community has to examine who are capable and who are not, which                
is a process that is rarely ever initiated outside of the individual claiming to be unable. This process is,                   
as we will see later in the project, simply ineffective. 
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Statement 
 
The main focus of this project will be answering the question: Why would a UBI be preferable to a                   
means-tested structure when it comes to economic distribution? 
 
 
Research questions 
 
● What is UBI? 
● How is UBI related to freedom? 
● How is UBI compatible with capitalism and socialism respectively? 
 
With these questions we are aiming at presenting an understanding of the concept of a UBI compared                 
to the structure of means testing in the perspective of which is ascribing more freedom to the                 
individual. Furthermore we will take up the question of the compatibility of a UBI within the two more                  
popular political systems, capitalism and socialism, to shed light on the political views that support the                
idea.  
 
Analysis 
 
What is UBI? 
 
On the 25th of November 2014 the Dutch bank ING announced a mass resignation of 2700                
employees. Emanuel Geurts from the Dutch trade union states on the website “De Unie” that the                
mass resignation of ING is typical for the environment of the financial sector today. Because of                
automatisation of the system, less employees are needed, which means that more people will be               
unemployed. In the Dutch documentary program “Tegenlicht” it is stated that the Western world              
today is getting less and less reliable. At any moment you are able to lose your job, either because of                    
budget cuts or the rise of technology that is taking over numerous amounts of jobs. Unemployment                
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and inequality are rising, which makes it clear that the current measures are unreliable in producing a                 
stable situation. Therefore, it is a good time to think about different tools for social upkeep and                 
redistributing wealth. Phillipe van Parijs writes about inequality and unemployment, and how UBI can              
be the answer to this problem  in his book Real Freedom for All (van Parijs 1995). 
 
To arrive at any qualified answers to the proposed research questions it becomes important to clearly                
define the scope of the main term of UBI. This section will attempt just that, while framing the                  
relevance of the term with contemporary social and economic concerns. Van Parijs introduces the              
UBI, defined in the problem area, as a tool to reach a just society with more equality. Van Parijs lists                    
the requirements of the UBI as he proposes it. According to van Parijs the payment should firstly be                  
an income paid in cash, without any restrictions as a timeframe in which it must be spent or whereon                   
it must be spent. The UBI should be paid on a regular basis instead of being a one-time capital grant.                    
Secondly, the UBI should be paid by a political community. Van Parijs states that “a basic income is                  
paid by a government of some sort out of publicly controlled resources. But it need not be paid by a                    
nation-state. Nor does it need to be paid out of redistributive taxation” (van Parijs 2000:4). Thirdly the                 
UBI must be paid to all members of society, although it is debatable who is a member of society (for                    
example non-citizens, children, pensioners and inmates). Fourthly he states that the UBI must be paid               
on an individual basis. This means it should be paid to each individual member of the community in a                   
uniform way. Fifthly, van Parijs argues that the UBI must be paid without any form of means test. The                   
amount received must be irrespective of income. Sixthly, he comments that the UBI should be               
irrespective of present work performances and of the willingness to work.  
 
As van Parijs mentiones in the beginning of his paper “Basic Income: A simple and powerful idea for                  
the 21st century” (Parijs 2004), scholars have different opinions on how wealth should be              
redistributed. Carole Pateman, a British feminist and political theorist, names two varieties in her              
paper “Democratizing Citizenship: Some Advantages of a UBI” (Pateman 2004), namely “a stake”             
which is a one-time capital grant from the government given when the individual reaches adulthood,               
and the UBI which is paid on a regular basis. Pateman, as van Parijs, argues in favor of the UBI for                     
several reasons. Most importantly she argues that “a basic income is a crucial part of any strategy for                  
democratic social change because, unlike a capital grant, it could help break the long-standing link               
between income and employment and end the mutual reinforcement of the institutions of marriage,              
employment and citizenship” (Pateman 2004:90). First, because the UBI will improve the            
democratisation of a society as people are more free to choose to be a paid employee and not being                   
8 / 36 
forced to do so. Second, because it will enhance the freedom of women, as they will no longer be                   
relying on a partner when raising their children. 
Pateman states that the form of UBI and the amount given in a UBI depends on your concept                  
of freedom and the goal the UBI should serve. When strictly beating poverty, a low UBI would be                  
enough. However, if one thinks of the UBI as a way to make life more democratic by separating                  
income from employment, the UBI should be high enough for all citizens to have a modest but decent                  
life and have the freedom to not be employed. Pateman sees the UBI as a basic right as citizenship                   
and suffrage. These rights are rights for life which is why UBI should exist over a citizen’s lifetime. A                   
stake, however, gives each individual a good start in life, but does not provide the individual with                 
anything else during their lifetime. Also, according to Pateman, a one-time capital grant is a big                
responsibility. She notes that even citizens who do not spend their money in Las Vegas or on drugs                  
can easily lose or waste their money. The UBI gives a lifelong, monthly secure income and enables                 
each individual to fully participate in society.  
 
In a video made by The European Initiative For Basic Income (2013), they explain why they are                 
convinced it is necessary to rethink our current system and how UBI is a good alternative. They state                  
that automation in manufacturing and wealth accumulation by financial institutions result in fewer             
jobs, which means that paid employment is no longer a right for everyone. Even though society is                 
generating more wealth than in any time in history, they state that the wealth is not distributed                 
equally among all citizens. 
In Tegenlicht, they state that in the current system, people with special needs receive an               
allowance in order to have a sustainable life. This system, however, only applies for the people with                 
“special needs”. One will therefore not receive an allowance when having a low-paid job, but only                
when one quits his job and goes on doing nothing. There are critics of the UBI who believe that the                    
willingness to work will be reduced when the UBI would be introduced, but looking at the previous                 
statement this seems not to be the case. We will discuss the willingness to work and the possible                  
reduction in the discussion. Also, when one qualifies for getting an allowance, he or she will have to                  
go through a long and difficult bureaucratic process in order to receive this allowance. In Tegenlicht                
there is stated that this system is very costly and as it is susceptible to fraud there must be a whole                     
organization just to control the system. There are organizations aiming to get unemployed people              
back to work, but this is uneffective and very expensive. Unemployed people are forced to take on                 
jobs far away from their homes and for which they are overqualified. According to the makers of                 
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Tegenlicht, this leads to a lot of humiliation and stress, which leads to more health care expenses. We                  
will expand on the result of humiliation in the discussion. 
In the video of Basic Income Europe (link 1), they note that UBI is therefore a more fair wealth                   
distributing system. They point towards Article 25 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,              
which claims that “everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and                 
well-being of himself and of his family including food, clothing, housing, medical care and necessary               
social services and the right to security in the event of unemployment…” (link 1). They see UBI as a                   
universal, individual, unconditional payment that each and every citizen receives on a monthly basis              
high enough in order to have a substantial life, cover the basic needs, and for every citizen to be able                    
to participate in society. According to them, the UBI will not only eliminate poverty, but also is a way                   
to develop non-market oriented work such as artistic creation, parenthood and volunteer work. Lastly              
they state that as everyone has money to spend, it will stimulate the economy and support local                 
businesses. The UBI will be financed through tax on luxury and polluting goods, and out of the money                  
we save through simplifying the current system of social transfers and public services. Gijs van               
Donselaar, a Dutch professor specialized in philosophy and Public Affairs, states that the UBI differs               
from any allowances as it is not only for those, who are in special needs but for all citizens. It is also                      
different from the socialist system, as any salary earned will be on top of the UBI. Each citizen is                   
completely free in deciding what they spend there UBI on and if they spend it at all (van Donselaar                   
1998:317). The UBI also thereby contributes to the equal freedom of opportunity which we will               
discuss later on.  
 
A UBI seems like a very radical idea, however, according to Imogen Foulkens from the BBC, Thomas                 
More introduced the concept in his work “Utopia in the 16th Century”. Noah Gordon, a journalist for                 
the Atlantic, states that in 1962 Milton Friedman advocated the idea of a minimum guaranteed               
income via “negative income tax”. He also mentions that in 1967, Martin Luther King Jr. campaigned                
for the guaranteed income. Richard Nixon and George McGovern also suggested a guaranteed annual              
income, but their proposal never came through.  
Today, the debate about the introduction of the UBI is still taking place. Noah Gordan adds                
that Switzerland is having a public vote for the introduction of UBI later this year. In the United States,                   
Wisconsin Representative Paul Ryan argues for a single funding stream instead of the complex system               
that is currently used. In an interview of van Parijs on EurActiv.com, van Parijs also mentions the                 
discussion on UBI in the Netherlands. Democracy 66 was one of the first political parties to consider                 
the idea in the late 1970’s. This debate is since recently added to the political agenda again. Kaisu                  
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Suopanki, a journalist for Transform, refers to the discussion on UBI in Finland. According to her, the                 
economic and political crises led to a critical view towards the Scandinavian welfare system. She               
states that many see the current system as becoming more bureaucratic, controlling, humiliating and              
inflexible. She also mentions that the current system claims that the unemployed are responsible for               
their own situation. She points towards a survey held in 2000, which showed that 63% of the Finns                  
were in favour of a UBI. Karl Widerquist, an Associate Professor at SFS-Qatar specializing in political                
philosophy, discusses the Permanent Fund Dividend in his article “The Alaska Model: a citizen’s              
income in practice” (Widerquist 2013). According to Widerquist, there has been a concept similar to               
UBI in Alaska, called Permanent Fund Dividend (PFD), since 1999. Citizens are paid an annual amount                
with no conditions besides being a citizen of Alaska, having residency and the willingness to fill out a                  
form. After the discovery of one of the largest oil reserves in state owned areas in Alaska, the Alaska                   
Permanent Fund (APF) was created. The APF is a fund in which the Alaskan government would invest                 
a small part of the money earned by the oil revenue each year. The money is then distributed                  
amongst the Alaskan citizens. Widerquist states that the APF has helped Alaska maintain one of the                
lowest poverty rates in the United States and made it the only US state in which equality rose rather                   
than fell during the 1990’s and 2000’s. 
 
Although there are various ways of defining and giving meaning to the UBI, we have chosen to                 
elaborate on the view of van Parijs. He sees UBI as a new way to stimulate social upkeep which is                    
needed as the current system is failing. Even though UBI seems as a controversial idea, it has been                  
discussed throughout the current and previous century. Because of the new tendence we see in the                
outside world today, it is interesting to look into this concept. Namely, how it relates to freedom and                  
how it is compatible with capitalism and socialism respectively. We will discuss these subjects later               
on. 
 
 
How is UBI related to freedom? 
 
Basically van Parijs argues for a UBI through his own take on a theory of freedom. His argumentation                  
is made from a ‘real’, as he cleverly states it, libertarian standpoint, which means that he somewhat                 1
1 When referring to ‘libertarian’ we mean the stand that is usually associated with views that “champion                                 
individual rights to ‘self­ownership’ and oppose paternalistic or moralistic legislation (...)” (Wolf 1998, 2012).                           
This definition both includes right and left wing libertarianism, the former relating to capitalist views on                               
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proves his point within ‘enemy territory’. The way he does this is by claiming that a libertarian, who                  
believes in freedom as a crucial aspect of a good society, must agree with his view. This view being                   
that liberty is not sufficiently liberty, unless it too takes into account the individual’s practical freedom                
as opposed to standard libertarianism, which only holds rights security as freedom prescribing. The              
argument for this simply being that formal freedom does not change the practical possibilities of a                
person, and without the ability to act you are not really free. So as to the question of how a UBI then                      
relates to the notion of freedom, one has to clarify this exact notion. It should intuitively be clear, in                   
any case to many, that a sum of money given to everyone despite their will to work, their economic                   
situation, who they choose to live with and where, over some given time would be an instrument to                  
make us free (or maybe just more free). But free from what and to do what, and when are we free                     
enough? A real libertarian, van Parijs states, should strive to maximize freedom – that is the highest                 
possible freedom for all (van Parijs 1995:25). 
 
Van Parijs operates with an enlarged notion of freedom. A free person may traditionally be defined as                 
someone, who is not being restricted from doing what that person wants to do. That is, no threat or                   
power is to be used to detain someone despite what is prescribed by laws regarding personal and                 
property rights. This former is his interpretation of formal freedom. As an example of rights belonging                
to such a theory of freedom one can imagine a farmer, who keeps sheep and make a living out of                    
selling wool and meat from them. For him to be able to upkeep his profession, and indeed make a                   
living, he needs the right to call the sheep his property, because else the wool and meat would be                   
worth nothing, since anybody else could claim it as theirs. In this case these anybodies are somewhat                 
detained from doing what they want to do, if what they want to do is to make use of the wool and eat                       
the meat from the sheep. The farmer then is kept free by laws about his right to property, which are                    
limiting someone else’s behaviour. The farmer’s rights limit some one else’s freedom, but that is a                
necessity to formal freedom. But for van Parijs this is just part of it real freedom. This kind of freedom,                    
to him, consists of three levels: 1) Freedom from coercion, as just mentioned, which he calls security,                 
2) self-government (in other connections also called autonomy) - it should be noted here that van                
Parijs assembles both of the former under the term freedom from coercion, in that he also sees                 
institutional limitations on e.g. where you are allowed to situate yourself as some kind of coercion.                
And 3) equality of opportunity, which he refers to as leximin opportunity (ibid.). This third layer is                 
freedom, which prohibits interference on the individual’s actions on the free market and in society as a whole                                   
from the state or others. The latter relates to socialistic/communistic views, which sees distribution of natural                               
resources, regulated on some sort of egalitarian basis, as a necessity to freedom (ibid.). 
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what distinguishes his notion of real freedom from the ‘traditional’ formal freedom, which is the sum                
of security and self-ownership. Real freedom then, he says, is not only having the right to do what you                   
want to do as a result of being free from any form of coercion, and not having done to you or to your                       
property, what you do not want to happen; it is, on top of that, also having the means to fulfill your                     
wishes to the highest possible extent. It is being able to make your life the closest it can possibly be to                     
your own conception of ‘the good life’. Here his theory of freedom is closely linked to equality in that                   
standard libertarianism (the version not ‘real’ to van Parijs) sees freedom only in the existence of the                 
right to say go on a worldwide cruise, that is, that no one is forced or threatened not to do so, but                      
where real freedom both includes the security for each individual to have the right to go on the cruise                   
and at the same time making everyone equal, or as close as possible to equal, in opportunity of                  
actually being able to do so. This is of course only to a fair degree; according to the level of the UBI,                      
which is seen in that opportunity is termed leximin. What this means is, in the words of van Parijs,                   
that in a free society, “the person with least opportunities has opportunities that are no smaller than                 
those enjoyed by the person with least opportunities under any other feasible arrangement; (...)”              
(ibid.). Van Parijs does not spend much time on the notion of equality though, although it is contained                  
in his concept of real freedom to a certain degree. We will come back to this in the following section                    
on the compatibility of a UBI with capitalism and socialism respectively, but for now a more thorough                 
explanation of the three parts of real freedom will be at its right place. 
Security, now also referenced as freedom from coercion, consists in not being restricted by              
some obstacles, the character of which are likely to vary in different forms of societies and                
institutional set-ups, to do what you are “legitimately entitled to” (ibid:20). What this means is, that a                 
free society should have some common rights, so that one could indeed be entitled to something. This                 
type of freedom is then provided by property rights, and as such “no society can be free if its                   
members can constantly be prevented from doing what they might want to do by the arbitrary use of                  
force or threats.” (ibid.). The existence of property rights creates a mutual framework for what we                
have freedom to and what we are not to be prevented by. That is, the individual member’s security in                   
this given society is secured through rights, which are enforced by some institution. But this is not                 
enough to van Parijs, as it only deems a society free, if it has rights over matters that are external to                     
the individual member. Here intuition tells us that something is clearly missing for a society to really                 
be free, because as he further argues, freedom characterized as such is “consistent with a very                
repressive but law-abiding system of slavery.” (ibid:21). Therefore we should turn our attention to the               
second part of real freedom, namely self-ownership. This second notion of freedom from coercion, he               
states, is a “transgression of a framework of rights which comprises the right to self-ownership” or a                 
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threat of such an incident (ibid.). What is of course central here is the principle of self-ownership. But                  
what does it mean to own one’s self and how does it differ from security, now that coercion is                   
understood as both a violation of property rights and a constraint on autonomy? Naturally there must                
be a difference, since a system of slavery does not live up to what being a free society should mean,                    
but van Parijs does not spend much time on elaborating on the principle of self-ownership. 
Therefore we will briefly turn our attention to some points by Carole Pateman on the               
democratizing effects of a UBI in general, what she just refers to as a basic income , before we return                   2
to the third and last part of real freedom. Pateman elaborates on the principle of self-ownership with                 
an overall view on a UBI not only as a means to eradicate poverty, but furthermore to advance                  
equality (not least women’s rights) in society, in that, as she states, it has a democratizing or                 
reinforcing effect on institutions such as employment and citizenship and thereby on society as a               
whole (Pateman 2004:89). The democratization, she speaks of is used in the most general sense of the                 
term, in that it basically is said to give more people more political influence.  
Pateman puts forward the view that as members of a democratic society, people are born               
free and equal to each other, but she does not see this as a static condition. Self-government is                  
something to be upheld. In her words we are to become citizens in interaction with institutions and                 
thereby further both our collective and individual self-government (ibid:91). This is an important             
distinction to Pateman, because although the institution of democracy is to provide the possibility of               
self-government through citizens’ participation in elections and other ways of forming society (e.g.             
influencing public opinion through the media or doing NGO-work), it can also be seen as having some                 
freedom restricting aspects to it. It is given that with laws come some kind of coercion, because it                  
does imply some restrictions - with property rights you are, as an example, not free to just take your                   
neighbour’s car to work (unless you are given permission by him). Therefore each individual citizen               
must also “have the opportunities and means to enjoy and safeguard their freedom” (ibid.). This view                
then implies a personal freedom to navigate and act within the borders of society’s restrictions (laws),                
and this is exactly, in Pateman’s view, what a UBI creates the foundations for. The argument for this                  
view is, in it’s simple form, that a UBI can be seen as a basic right in the sense of Henry Shue, from                       
whom Pateman lends the democratic rule of thumb that no one is allowed to sink beneath the line                  
drawn by basic rights. One example of such rights is the right to subsistence. From the notion that                  
rights are basic “‘if enjoyment of them is essential to the enjoyment of all other rights.’” (ibid:94), a                  
2 In her article Pateman does not specify, what kind of a basic income she is referring to when writing “a 
basic income”. She goes with the simple definition being a “payment of a regular sum by a government to 
each individual (citizen) over an adult lifetime, with no conditions attached.” (Pateman 2004: 1). 
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UBI is legitimized in that it is seen as necessary to be able to enjoy other rights such as the right to                      
have democratic influence on your own society. This right is of course “necessary to enable all citizens                 
to participate as fully as they wish in all aspects of the life of their society.” (ibid.). 
What this leaves us with is an understanding of the notion of self-ownership not only as the                 
security not to have the right to your own body (or person) violated, but also as the freedom to                   
influence your own life within society as a democratic right and therefore obviously as a mandatory                
condition for a free society. So for now let us return to van Parijs and investigate the third part of real                     
freedom, which partly resembles Pateman’s view on self-ownership, in that it to some extent make up                
the foundation for maneuvering within a society of (freedom restricting) laws. Here again we note a                
distinction between formal and practical freedom, since rights are not sufficient in themselves; that              
citizens need means and power to act to be really free. But it is also important to note that the three                     
parts of real freedom come in a list of priorities to van Parijs (van Parijs 1995:25), meaning that he is                    
not hinting at some sort of ultimate freedom. He of course believes that some restrictions are                
necessary. It would e.g. make no sense to keep from imprisoning people to secure other citizens                
because of the fact that such an act is in fact a violation of the self-ownership of the villain, and                    
furthermore it would be nonsense to discuss redistribution of goods in society, if no property rights                
whatsoever are enforced therein. 
Opportunity then is the distinguishing feature of van Parijs’ notion, real freedom. It is the               
most central part of his argument for a UBI but also the trickier one to both comprehend and                  
generalize, as it implies a measuring of freedom through a wide set of possible opportunities for the                 
individual to choose between, whose values are often difficult to compare. And these opportunities              
are either present, to come or desirable, as put forward by Martin van Hees and Marcel Wissenburg,                 
who have also argued for a distinction between the process of freedom of choice as such and the                  
value of sets of opportunities available to the individual in their article ‘Freedom and Opportunity’               
(van Hees & Wissenburg 1999). Here they state that a theory of freedom, which incorporates               
opportunity sets and individual preferences, must take into account the fact that the value of a set of                  
opportunities must be grounded in some ethical standard, before such sets can be levelled, because,               
as they write: 
 
(...) what matters in assessing opportunity freedom are not the actual preferences of individuals,              
but reasonable preferences, not the reasonable preferences that they actually have but those             
they might have, and not their own potential reasonable preferences but those of others.              
(ibid:79) 
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And, moreover, that this levelling of the quality of opportunity sets is something very different to a                 
theory of freedom such as freedom of choice , indeed it is no theory of freedom in itself.  3
This is important to bear in mind when reading van Parijs’ ‘Real Freedom for All’ (van Parijs 1995),                  
because he is very focused on the freedom of choice and argues for a compensation through a UBI for                   
all kinds of disadvantages or deprived situations. One can then legitimately ask the question of how                
or perhaps how much you should be compensated. And moreover from which ethical standard              
should this be measured? This will be taken up as part of a critique on van Parijs’ wide conception of                    
opportunity freedom later on. But for now let us continue with the elaboration on the real freedom. 
Van Parijs makes the point that security and self-ownership are not in themselves sufficient to               
provide freedom, since you are not free to do anything, unless you have some access to external                 
objects (ibid:21). In this sense the former two parts will not do the job, because they only demand                  
protection of rights, which makes you free from coercion, but they do not provide a possibility to act.                  
This is of course where opportunity (opportunity freedom or practical freedom, as we recall) enters               
the picture. With this addition to formal freedom, van Parijs takes on the ones he calls “the advocates                  
of pure capitalism who claim to give freedom a prominent place”, as his real freedom is a (libertarian,                  
still) critique of the capitalist conception of freedom that it is limited to being one’s own master, being                  
able to follow one’s own choice and being entitled to have property, since, as he states shortly, what                  
is preventing individuals from acting (depriving them of the means of action, that being money, power                
etc.) is actually the sole concept of property rights (ibid:22). It should be stated here that van Parijs                  
does not wish to get rid of property rights, but that he of course believes in a fair redistribution of                    
goods through a UBI to diminish the inequality in society stemming from ownership of property.               
Focusing on opportunities also brings to the table another conception of freedom restricting             
obstacles, in that in formal freedom these obstacles are constituted by coercion external to the               
individual, but with real freedom internal limitations too count as restricting. Thereby not being said               
that the full potential of freedom can only be achieved, when everyone is free and in capacity to live                   
out their wildest dreams, just that it too counts as freedom restricting to, inculpable at least, be a                  
limitation to yourself. That is if you are in no desert of your deprived situation, you are indeed made                   
less free, and therefore you should be compensated to some extent, because “via our earning power,                
our personal abilities massively affect what we shall be permitted to acquire.” (ibid:23). For this view                
3 The simple but sufficient definition of this theory is the right to to what you want, unhindered by any 
manipulation, unless it infringes on the the wants of other persons and/or can be considered harmful to 
yourself or another (link 2). 
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not to expand endlessly into covering every particular instance of deprivation of freedom through              
unlucky distribution of abilities and temperament from nature, van Parijs defends real freedom by              
implementing some kind of common sense restriction, called potential desire, on what one might              
want to do. How this works will be discussed later on together with the aforementioned critique of                 
van Parijs’ wide conception of opportunity freedom. 
But how then does this freedom indeed relate to a UBI? The short answer is that a UBI of                   
course is said to promote such a free society, in that it gives each individual the means or the power                    
to go about and actually influence his own life and affect society as a whole. Paradoxically though                 
redistribution as such inevitably clashes with property rights, which shakes van Parijs’ list of priorities               
in real freedom for all (#1 being security, #2 self-ownership and #3 opportunity). This, however, just                
proves that the scheme is of course not that rigid but, rather, flexible according to each individual                 
situation, that is: specific reasons can legitimize another priority of the three as shown earlier on. 
 
 
Critique of van Parijs’ understanding of freedom 
 
Van Parijs, as mentioned previously justifies basic income on the notion he calls “real freedom”, which                
simply put is the freedom to do whatever one might want to do. He argues that the more resources                   
made available to an individual the more free that individual is to do whatever they want. Widerquist                 
argues that there are two very important limitations to van Parijs’ argument for a UBI that keep it                  
from being a convincing case as to why a basic income need not only be universal but also                  
unconditional and enough to meet a person's basic needs (Widerquist 2011:2). Introducing an             
alternative argument for a basic income, Widerquist proposes his notion of freedom referred to as               
“freedom as effective control self ownership” or ECSO which he believes is a more gripping concept of                 
freedom.  
 
Van Parijs’ first limitation to his idea of “real freedom” is that it is so broad and hard to measure                    
because it is unclear as to what kind of policy it actually supports (Widerquist 2011:2). In the idea of a                    
“real freedom” based society everyone is entitled to something. Though it is not clear as to whether                 
that something is unconditional, basic, or an income. Widerquist tries to go further into detail as to                 
why a UBI should be universal, unconditional, and large enough to meet an individual's basic               
needs.The second limitation according to Widerquist would be that van Parijs does not give a               
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compelling enough reason to show why people would be entitled to a UBI large enough to support                 
their individual basic needs. It does not give a compelling enough reply to the reciprocity or                
exploitation objection to UBI. According to these objections workers are needed to help produce the               
income that is to be distributed unconditionally. If the recipients are not held to a reciprocal objection                 
to help aid in producing the income, they would supposedly exploit the workers who do (Widerquist                
2011:3). Van Parijs’ response to this objection depends on the concept of liberal neutrality. Which in                
this a basic income gives people the choice to work and not to work, giving two choices that represent                   
the notion of the good life, and a liberal government should be neutral between those two choices.                 
Widerquist states that van Parijs’ response is not convincing enough because the reciprocity objection              
is not simply based on a desire to promote a single version of the good life, it is based on a moral                      
claim to resources (Widerquist 2011:3). Widerquist says that if one group of people earns their right                
to resources while another refuses to do what is necessary to earn that right, then neutrality is no                  
reason to treat them equally. The following will discuss what ECSO freedom is and how it relates to a                   
UBI. 
Widerquist’ ECSO freedom is the power to refuse or accept active cooperation with other              
willing people. Which for example if you are invited for a cup of coffee as a free person you should                    
have the ability to refuse or accept the invitation, keeping your choices voluntary and unforced. A free                 
person has the right to socially interact with whomever they choose, such as saying yes or no to a                   
meeting with someone. There are two forms of social interaction: firstly, the interaction to keep out                
of each others way such as the designation of public streets and the rules to use them. Secondly,                  
peoples interaction to work together to achieve some goal. Widerquist says that mandatory rules for               
the first form of interaction is almost always unavoidable, but as long as they are not one sided and                   
truly designed to keep each other out of each other's way they do not interfere with a person’s                  
control over their own life . Widerquist states that social interaction is not a bad thing, in fact it is a                     
good thing, but it is no excuse for a group of people to impose their own idea of desirable terms of                     
interaction onto people who have no other choice but to accept. For example if one has the power to                   
force you to meet with them for dinner, be it from physical intimidation or some other form of force,                   
for that moment at least you are not a free person. The same is to be said if someone has the power                      
to force people not to be able to meet. A free person cannot be directly or indirectly forced to make                    
choices that serve the interests of others (Widerquist 2011:4).  
If the concept of freedom is to involve freedom from force, then there needs to be an                 
understanding of what it means to be forced. Widerquist uses Gerald Cohen's definition of force               
simply described as “when a person is forced to do something, he has no reasonable or acceptable                 
18 / 36 
alternative. He need have no alternative at all” (Widerquist 2006:44). Widerquist mentions that             
Cohen states: “Being forced does not necessarily mean doing so unfreely or involuntarily if you are                
being forced to do something you would willingly have done anyway for another reason”(Widerquist              
2006:83). According to Widerquist if human interaction is to be unforced there needs to be some sort                 
of acceptable default option they can use if they wish to refuse interaction. Therefore to have the                 
power to say no, one must be able to produce for themselves a life that is reasonable, acceptable, and                   
not thoroughly bad in an absolute sense (Widerquist 2006:43-44) giving reason to why a UBI would be                 
necessary in order to have the freedom stated above or rather the “power to say no”. 
According to Widerquist the word freedom is used in two different ways: “as a continuum of                
allowances such as a stop light reduces one's freedom and the status sense such as an individual being                  
released from prison gives them freedom” (Widerquist 2006:33). If two people make arrangements to              
respect each other's space it will make them unfree (in the continuous sense of freedom) to do                 
specific things, but as long as the arrangements still allow them the ability to go on with their own                   
lives they will remain free people (in the status sense of freedom).  
In order to have the first freedom Widerquist explains that you would need familiar civil rights                
such as freedom of speech, movement, association, and political participation. With being able to              
refuse any unwanted cooperation this is why you will need a unconditional access to resources (or                
UBI). If someone is to come between you and the minimal resources you need as a human being to                   
survive, not only can they directly interfere with your ability to live a decent and free life, they can                   
also force you to do just about anything (Widerquist 2011:4).  
 
A UBI is not simply desired so you can do whatever you want but also aids in The power to refuse to                      
work which is essential Widerquist says to ensure that anyone who is to work is actually voluntarily                 
doing so. Widerquist states that people with a UBI still have to buy from property owners, but that                  
they are not forced to serve them. For example if you agree to hand me some money but I agree that I                      
am going to buy some property from you, the situation as a whole does not involve me serving you.                   
He continues to say that without a direct access to resources a person must work for an employer's                  
goals all day to receive the money needed to achieve their own goals. There is nothing wrong with a                   
person working for cash as long as it is voluntary but if people do not have direct access to resources,                    
they are left with no choice but to work for someone who controls resources (Widerquist 2011:4). In a                  
free society (in this case a society that does not interfere with an individual's choices or resources)                 
with an economy based on voluntary trade between free individuals it is unacceptable for any group                
of people to take control of resources in order to have others serve their needs, whether the force is                   
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systemic or indirect makes it no less powerful or threatening to freedom (Widerquist 2011:4).              
Widerquist says UBI also serves as an exit option. For example protecting a parent from a spouse who                  
controls resources of a family or a person taking a job they do not wish to have such as an individual                     
whose passion is architecture but ends up taking work in food service because that individual had no                 
other choice, if he or she was to have the means to make a living. 
Widerquist says that rather than rely on a weak application of liberal neutrality (as mentioned               
earlier from van Parijs), ECSO freedom can show that the reciprocity objection is misplaced entirely.               
All able bodied adults with the right knowledge can meet their own basic needs without working for                 
any property owners if they are free from interference (Widerquist 2011:5). All an able bodied               
individual needs to have ECSO freedom from others Widerquist says is to have a negative duty(which                
would be a duty not to do harm to an individual), a duty of forbearance. Others would only need                   
refrain from interfering with a sufficient amount of resources so that individual can provide for               
himself (Widerquist 2011:5). Widerquist' argument employs the reciprocity principle in defense of a             
UBI because those who control resources currently have no reciprocal duty to compensate for the               
propertyless for the loss of freedom created by the assignment of property rights over natural               
resources to some individuals and not to others. 
In order to truly be free as Widerquist’s argument shows, you need to have control over your own                  
life. The "power to say no"; to be in control of your social interactions. It is necessary if you are to                     
uphold Widerquist' idea of ECSO freedom that all social interactions are voluntary and unforced. If               
you are to have the power to say no you must be able to produce a life for yourself that is reasonably                      
decent, which is why a UBI is so important if you are to have the ability to obtain resources to support                     
at least your basic needs. Accepting a job that you in another situation would never have taken,                 
because your only other option is to be homeless is said to leave you unfree. Having effective control                  
over your own life may be a step in the right direction toward the idea of freedom and a UBI can                     
certainly help achieve some of those freedoms.  
 
 
How is UBI compatible with capitalism and socialism respectively? 
 
This chapter will aim to present a comprehensive link between UBI as a feature within an economy,                 
and the overarching structure of the economy. One important differentiation between socialism and             
capitalism is their understanding of and dedication towards equality, and that will be the primary               
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focus of this section. After a short introduction of various terms concerning the debate, we will move                 
into the definitions and utilise them to compliment our examination of the question of compatibility. 
The UBI as a concept is easily misunderstood as a socialist notion and a tool to redistribute                 
wealth, and because of this is considered in direct relation to stimulating equality. However, this is not                 
as self-evident a case as one might think, as we will see from the in depth look at both the economic                     
landscape promoted by socialism and capitalism respectively, along with their reasoning for possibly             
adopting a UBI to support their goals. 
 
If we consider both socialism and capitalism to be the two primary possibilities for economy systems                
to assume the structure of, we must ask; what exactly is the measure for distinguishing whether a                 
society is then indeed structured best? One possible measure could be freedom. If we take freedom                
as an example in this way we can look upon the systems of either capitalism or socialism and evaluate                   
how and where they each succeed in promoting freedom. If we consider ourselves bold, we may even                 
try and qualify the extent of the freedom offered by either system, and from there we could hope to                   
arrive at a justification for choosing one system over the other. The latter is a task for another project,                   
however. Components of both systems will be examined and attributed graded success in promoting              
freedom, but this is only to undertake the task of determining compatibility with a UBI. Finally, it                 
should become clear to the reader that what is primarily sought after in the extension of a larger                  
system by the implementation of UBI is not just the somewhat intangible idea of freedom, but also                 
the loosening of rigid areas within the system itself. Certain areas, for instance the job market, may be                  
termed rigid, if they generally contain low practical mobility. Switching from one job to another, for                
whatever reason, is a task, and this task becomes more or less flexible in its demand to the individual                   
performing it proportionally to how rigid the job market within society is. This, in turn, is directly                 
translatable to what might be termed practical mobility in society, and this is a component of the                 
more general term freedom. The less rigid the subdivisions of a given society are the more freedom                 
this society can claim, allowing for a more flexible environment for its citizens. 
 
So what defines capitalism and socialism, and how may these definitions aid us in discerning the                
probability of compatibility with a UBI? 
 
Capitalism and socialism, for our purposes, are defined as follows: An economy may be considered               
capitalist, when its means of material production are privately owned, and conversely socialist when              
the means of material production are publically owned. Private ownership entails individual            
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governance or voluntary association of several individuals, whereas public ownership denotes           
ownership by political communities or associates of these communities. As for the ideological             
background motivating the economic system of either capitalism and socialism, they each strive             
towards the common goal of structuring the best possible society, with their respective             
understandings of what a good life for citizens entails. Embedded within this clearly distinguished              
motivation towards private or public ownership lies the interpretation of what role wealth             
concentrations in society should play in the overall result of providing citizens with the best possible                
lives. In capitalism it is primarily important that one is secured with the formal freedom to build ones                  
own life, whereas in socialism it becomes of primary importance to allow for a shared wealth. These                 
qualifications are evidently not mutually exclusive, yet it serves a purpose to note what seems of                
primary importance to a given structure. For an example, a capitalist system simply cannot be said to                 
function efficiently for its ideologically defined purposes, and systematic expectations of economic            
perpetuations, if it does not secure individual rights to profit. 
Capitalism handles private wealth concentrations as a biproduct of allowing citizens the            
freedom to interact in the market place for personal gain, while socialism views these same private                
wealth concentrations instead as resources that all of society should receive a share of. This implies                
also that each of the two systems interpret equality in very different ways. Capitalism secures a                
equality of rights for its citizens by allowing each of them the formal freedom to engage in the                  
marketplace and create their own success, by allowing for as much of the profit of a given business                  
venture to enter private hands as possible. Socialism instead secures less of this type of freedom by                 
applying more public ownership to the individual components of an economy, yet provides also              
equality of rights plus the partial equality of resources applied by redistributing taxed profits, and               
while the prior type of equality, related to the formal freedom of more extensive private ownership, is                 
lessened, the latter type of equality, related to universal sharing in the general trends of market                
success, is heightened. From this examination we may extract the proposition that; capitalism             
concerns itself with securing initial freedom, whereas socialism concerns itself with securing freedom             
at the end level. One pitfall of capitalism would be for the system to secure opportunity for property -                   
that not all property is already owned, thereby decreasing the possibility to profit, and having the                
system fail its purpose. This introduces what seems a paradox, where the system seems to want to                 
motivate the expansion of private property on a planet with finite resources and finite space,               
however, as we clearly see from the explosion of digital rights and digital property discussions going                
on, the economy allows for a renewable resource generation and appropriation. The introduction of              
digital products seem to have unmasked this paradox as simply a shortcoming of previous economic               
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realities. For socialism the pitfall is failing to generate the productivity commonly linked to the               
prospect of personal profit. If a given economic system fails to deliver the quantity and quality of an                  
alternate system, then it voids its own argument for efficiency. 
Initial freedom is the freedom to make investments and possibly gain differentiating rewards             
that elevate the individual’s resources further optimising the freedom of him or her. This comes at the                 
price of sacrificing some amount of optimisation of freedom for all of society, typically by the                
reduction of taxation to motivate the investment. Freedom at the end level means that the same                
investments, made by either an individual or the state, is shared by all of society irrespective of their                  
involvement, and as such the rewards are also shared. This then comes at the opposite price of                 
sacrificing some amount of optimisation of freedom for the investing individual or institution that the               
rewarded resources may have brought, in favor of optimising the freedom of everyone. The same               
logic applies to employment. 
 
To extend our comprehension of the way in which these two key terms of capitalism and socialism are                  
being utilised in the debate about UBI it becomes important to note that they are subject to gradation                  
on an inversely proportional scale. An economy can, for instance, approximate something we might              
term pure capitalism by furthering its distance from the equivalent of pure socialism through targeting               
for reduction various internal components of the economy that would be considered socialist, such as               
social expenditures covered by the state or political community. Additionally it must be pointed out               
that capitalism and socialism are alike in the fact that they afford their citizens self-ownership,               
meaning that every individual owns himself. This self-ownership is also subject to gradation, and can               
be measured on its application for a given society by how widely its judicial system infringes upon                 
personal practices through coercive methods such as policing. Parijs concludes his defining overview             
of capitalism and socialism by stating that capitalism seems the more likely candidate in search for a                 
more free society, since it provides the greatest opportunity of maintaining absolute autonomy while              
also enabling the extension of material ownership for each individual citizen (Parijs 1995:5-7).             
However, when looking at John Rawls’ Difference Principle, which Parijs defines thusly: 
 
In its original formulation, Rawls’s Difference Principle is the requirement that socio-economic            
advantages (income and wealth, powers and prerogatives, the social bases of self-respect)            
should be maxminned, that is, distributed in such a way that the least-advantaged end up with                
at least as many such advantages as the least-advantaged would end up with under any               
alternative arrangement. (van Parijs 1995:94-95) 
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We see that capitalism could not possibly satisfy this principle. If freedom is to be as well off as one                    
could possibly be in an alternatively arranged society, then capitalism affords little freedom to              
everyone but the successfully employed and the successful investors. As explained above, capitalism             
cares less for the end result of transactions and more for the formal freedom to engage in them at                   
one’s own risk, and because of this important feature of the structure, some will inevitably lose out                 
and become “least-advantaged”. If one is free to invest and reap rewards, one conversely is also free                 
to absorb the costs of a given investment. This can challenge both oneself and one's descendants,                
whom will be born into a position of lesser advantage than others, through no fault of their own,                  
which adds limits to the extent at which they are practically free. To counter this one might fall into                   
the trap of reverting to the traditional counter argument of socialism, but perhaps there is another                
way of looking at this issue. 
 
By extending capitalism with a UBI model society could allow for a minimum income irrespective of                
employment, income, and accumulated wealth, and thereby invoke a socio-economic landscape           
where each individual is allowed a higher degree of economic freedom, relative to that offered by                
standard socialism as described above. This is because it holds the benefit that allows for each person,                 
fortunate or unfortunate, to retain a guaranteed livable income. A benefit that was previously              
reserved for socialism, or socialist components within a given economy, under a means-tested model.              
One might qualify for certain benefits afforded by wealth distribution, unavailable in standard             
capitalism. In this regard this extended capitalism is superior in terms of what it delivers to its                 
constituents than standard socialism. Crucially this does not cover socialism extended by the same              
principle of UBI which we must obtain an understanding of in order to arrive at a qualified estimate of                   
which type of structure the UBI would be most compatible with. 
 
To extend socialism with a UBI is slightly more of a puzzle. Through our analysis of socialism so far, by                    
now it should seem quite capable inherently of the job that the UBI would do, namely the guarantee                  
of a lower boundary to opportunities for all citizens. Socialism achieves this goal by introducing an                
upper boundary, of varying flexibility inversely proportional to the purity of socialism in the given               
society, on wealth concentrations both through income, capital income, and inheritance. It creates a              
level playing field through force of taxation and appropriation. So what does UBI have to offer                
socialism? 
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The UBI primarily seeks to replace any means-testing model in place, and without a UBI,               
socialism, unless completely pure, would require such a structure, as it seeks to award as much                
equality as possible to its citizens. This means that a UBI would allow for socialism to deviate from                  
purity, and thus serve the motivating factor of personal profit for those individuals enticed by it. It                 
also allows for even less rigidity in employment, due to the fact that a livable income is already                  
granted in kind, allowing for people to decide between being employed and not being employed. This                
has the additional benefit of opening positions that were otherwise held down by a more rigid model,                 
and therefore by extension it not only allows for people to choose between having a job and not                  
having a job, but also between staying in a current position and taking another, since job demand                 
overall can be assumed to enter a decline. Outside of a UBI, we have means-testing, and that serves                  
directly to only grant livable income to those deemed unable to maintain a job, meaning that only                 
these people are allowed systematically to be unemployed. Allowing everyone to choose            
unemployment compliments the assumption of more people opting out of their positions, and these              
positions might be attractive to others. 
 
From our examination we see that a UBI is quite compatible with equal and unequal societies alike.                 
This benefits the case for a UBI since it is not limited by the most commonly applied economic                  
structures. It fits a variety of cases and enhances the given realities of these by introducing more                 
freedom and more flexibility. 
 
 
Discussion 
 
Mincome Project Dauphin 
 
In the Canadian town Dauphin there has been an experiment with a concept similar to the UBI, called                  
the mincome project, in the 70’s. About 1000 households received the minimal income for 4 years,                
which led to a surprising outcome. However, after the project had ended successfully, no further               
actions had been taken. The results were lost for years where after the Canadian economist Evelyn                
Forget Found them and started a research. She wrote an article about her findings, which made the                 
UBI a ‘hot topic’ again. Ron Hikel, the research leader of the time, tells us they were interested in how                    
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the minimal would have labor effects, such as if people would work less, social effects, as pregnancy                 
and marriage, and the economical effects on society. He explains that there was an interest of both                 
the left wing as the right wing in politics about the minimal income, as previous systems related to the                   
UBI had a 100% taxation rate that made people stop working. The aim of the mincome project was to                   
find a way of supporting people who needed support, without discouraging them from working. The               
high sense of community and cohesion, and isolation made Dauphin a right place for the experiment                
to take place. Also, the labour market in Dauphin at that time wasn’t very thick, which resulted in a lot                    
of people having several jobs in order to cover their basic needs. Many people belonged to the                 
so-called “working poor”, who would work every day on several small jobs but still wouldn’t have                
enough money to cover their expenses. With the mincome project, 1000 households would get a               
monthly paycheck on top of their usual income. The amount they would get depended on their usual                 
income as well as the amount of people in their household.  
The different participants of the mincome project spent their money in different ways. One              
single mother of two had the chance to study as a librarian because of the extra money she received                   
that made it able for her to get a better paid job. Before the mincome project, the only option she had                     
in order to take care of her two children financially was to stop working in order to receive money                   
from the government. Other families were able to have a holiday, get medical care, or would save up                  
the money in order to buy a truck that would help them earning more money in the future. Another                   
positive outcome of the mincome project was the increase in doctor visits. This effect was caused by                 
two factors, first was the physical factor; fewer accidents, injuries, family violence, and less              
consumption of alcohol and drugs. The second factor was the increase of mental complaints; fewer               
people were depressed or stressed. In general, people got healthier and happier. The fear that people                
would work less was partly true, some people worked less hours. However, the people who did work                 
less, did not waste their time. Many young male adults reduced their working hours up to 80%, but                  
when Evelyn Forget looked into where they were during that time, she found them in high school                 
trying to get a degree in order to have a better job in the future.  
The mincome project was a success, however the outcome of this experiment wasn’t used              
afterwards. There was a political change that replaced the progressive government with a             
conservative government. This new government would not finance the project any longer and the              
archives were put away in boxes and stored in a warehouse. Ron Hikel states that in order for a social                    
experiment as the mincome project to have data worth analyzing, the experiment must run for at                
least 5-10 years. But as the political climate changes rapidly, there is no government who is interested                 
in introducing a costly project in order to get long-term results. 
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 In the current welfare system, people are forced to quit their jobs in order to get welfare                 
allowances. This system actually encourages people to stop working and do nothing instead of              
continuing their jobs, going back to school or taking on volunteer jobs as they are able to do so                   
through UBI. When people are given their own responsibility over their money and their lives, they                
will get more active, healthier and happier. 
 Ron Hikel describes that the UBI would be a good system today as the inequality among                
citizens has never been this high and is growing. This inequality causes social frustration, drug and                
alcohol abuse and criminal behavior under the less fortunate as people don’t feel as if they are part of                   
the society anymore.  
 
 
Willingness to work 
 
In a review on van Parijs’ paper “What’s Wrong With a Free Lunch?” Pierre-Yves Néron, a French                 
professor of Ethics and Politics, points out some of the critiques on UBI and then rejects them. A                  
general concern from critics of UBI is according to Néron the “incentive problem”. This means the                
concern that the willingness to work will cease to exist, since if every individual receives a monthly                 
payment enough to have a sustainable life, why would they bother working? Van Parijs responds to                
this by saying “So What?”. 
 
Boosting the labour supply is not an aim in itself. No one can reasonably want an overworked,                 
hyperactive society. Give people of all classes an opportunity to reduces their working time or               
even take a complete break from work in order to look after their children or elderly relatives.                 
You will not only save on prison and hospitals. You will also improve the human capital of the                  
next generation. A modest UBI is a simple and effective instrument in the service of keeping a                 
socially and economically sound balance between the supply of paid labour and the rest of our                
lives. (van Parijs 2001 :23-24). 
 
Van Parijs argues that we should look at the way we want our society to be. He sees it as more                     
important to have a “happy” society, where people are able to take care of themselves and each                 
other, than an “overworked, hyperactive society” with high crime and hospital rates. 
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Another argument close to the incentive problem stated above is the problem of reciprocity.              
Néron introduces the question “Why should we give a monthly amount to a young man who surfs all                  
day long?” (Néron 2002:4). Néron points out Rawls’ “conception of a political community as a system                
of mutual cooperation” (Néron 2002:4). UBI could be seen, as Néron states, as an easy way of                 
violating the norm of reciprocity since people are able to take without giving. He argues this                
statement by commenting that the surfer contributes to society by buying food, shelter and materials               
for his leisure. It is almost impossible not to affect and be affected by society, although every                 
individual contributes in his or her own way.  
As mentioned in the example of the mincome project, introducing a system as the UBI will                
actually stimulate the willingness to work. In the current system of welfare, people will only receive an                 
allowance when they do not work. Having a small job will therefore, in some cases, lower their                 
income. Since the UBI is for every citizen, with or without paid employment, people will sooner take                 
on small jobs that will come on top of their UBI. An example from the Mincome Project is the mother                    
of two who had a low paid job as a librarian. When she did not earn enough money to sustain her                     
children, she was advised to quit her job in order to get an allowance which would give her a higher                    
income than whilst working. When the Mincome Project was introduced she did quit her job, however                
she invested her time in getting a higher education. Because of the extra money she received, she                 
could spend time on studying without having financial problems. As a result of this investment of                
time, she was able to get a better job with a higher salary. Thus, as the woman would be forced to                     
quit her job in the current system and would have to apply for an allowance, because of the Mincome                   
Project she was able to invest her time in education to get a better job and a better life for herself and                      
her children.  
A lot of people who are not employed contribute to society through social work, taking care of                 
the people around them or making art. An example would be a person who enjoys doing volunteer                 
work at a youth center, but is not able to do this as much as he or she wants because then they would                       
have no income. The UBI would make it possible for this person to do volunteer work and thereby                  
improving the lives of others. Without the UBI, if one would have a old family member that needs                  
special care, one would not be able to take care of this person his or herself as he or she would not                      
have any income. This elderly person would be sent to an institution for elderly people and would be                  
looked after there. This would cost a lot of money for the family, and in some countries as well for the                     
state, and they will not be included in the care as much as they would want to be. With the UBI, this                      
person could stop working or work less hours and still be able to make it financially, and take care of                    
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their family member by themselves. This would reduce costs for the family and reduce costs for the                 
state. 
In conclusion, the possible effect of the UBI reducing the willingness to work should not be                
considered a problem. Firstly van Parijs argues that even if it would lead to this effect, it is not a                    
problem as the reduction of working hours will lead to less stress and more happiness. Secondly                
Néron points out that the people reducing their working hours or quitting their jobs will invest their                 
time in other activities which could be beneficial for society or their direct environment. The Mincome                
Project is a good example for these statements and provides empirical grounds for rejecting the               
problem of the possible reduced willingness to work. 
 
 
Understanding real libertarianism 
 
Stating a new take on a well-established and hundreds of years old philosophical tradition to be ‘the                 
real version’ is indeed quite a large step to take. It is a bold move of van Parijs and such a move                      
cannot but draw attention to itself. This is why we will now go into details on the borderline of                   
libertarianism, real libertarianism and egalitarianism to further our understanding of van Parijs’ take             
on real freedom. As we have mentioned earlier, van Parijs refers to himself as a libertarian, who                 
believes freedom to have “paramount importance” (van Parijs 1995:1) – that is, of course, importance               
for a just, and thereby good society. But as his theory presents, freedom in its formal character is not                   4
sufficient to provide such a society or to formulate it differently, instead real freedom is needed, and                 
real freedom is characterized by adding practical opportunities on top of regular freedom, as we               
recall. So is this new take not egalitarianism? And if not – what then? 
To answer this question we need to take a closer look at the rights that come from having                  
formal freedom in the sense of van Parijs, which includes security and self-ownership. These rights are                
in a democratic sense basic, since they make up the foundation for a society with trade interactions of                  
property and individual freedom to be your own master within such a system. From a standard right                 
wing libertarian perspective these rights make up freedom as such, and hence sufficient freedom is               
provided where these rights are situated and enforced. But from a left-wing libertarian perspective,              
freedom occurs first when means of power are (re)distributed to a degree, in which more or all                 
4 The distinction between these two terms will be central for the discussion to come as they are seen as 
representing a setting apart of libertarianism and egalitarianism in that both have as their goal a good 
society, but that their means to this end vary in terms of justice and equality. 
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people have not only the right but the ability to do what they want. At the same time what we see                     
here can also be interpreted as two different perspectives of egalitarianism; it can be argued that                
these theories have as foundations different perceptions of the degree of necessary equality. A right               
wing-libertarian believes in equality of rights, that is, they generally believe in the equal worth or                
moral status of persons, so that no one is situated below a certain threshold of value to society, other                   
people, etc. (Link 3). But from this point on each individual is held responsible for reaching his or her                   
individual life goals. This is precisely the flaw of libertarianism that van Parijs sets to eliminate, and in                  
this move he draws together basic perspectives on freedom from libertarianism and a welfare              
maximizing egalitarianism made up of the leximin opportunity. The argument of compensating            
people, who are less well off is in this sense easy to follow both from a libertarian and an egalitarian                    
perspective, because they, in the theory of van Parijs, join forces to reach a more just society. But has                   
a more equal distribution of means and power anything to do with freedom as such? We will now                  
examine the link between having freedom per se and being free or, for the sake of differentiation,                 
able to do what you want. As we have shown earlier, opportunity freedom can at times infringe on                  
other peoples formal freedom, and is it not a paradox to have freedom limiting freedom? The                
ableness aspect, opportunity freedom or practical freedom, whatever we choose to call it, can be               
argued to be something other than freedom, if one understands it as a question of welfare                
optimization, indeed separating egalitarianism from libertarianism; distinguishing the idea of a good            
society from that of a purely just society.  
Mark Hunyadi and Marcus Mänz presents the view that levelling peoples practical            
opportunities should be considered apart from freedom in their article “Does “Real-Freedom-for-All”            
Really Justify Basic Income?” from the Swiss Political Science Review (Hunyadi & Mänz 1998). For this                
discussion we will not take up the critique stemming from the title, but rather choose to focus on                  
some of the points they make on the notion of real freedom and it’s justification.  
In their argument they set aside desire from freedom, because of a flaw they see in van Parijs’ notion                   
of potential desire, which is a tool used by him in discussing compensation. This flaw being that,                 
although it deals with the problem of potentially manipulated desires justifying contented slavery as              
mentioned by van Parijs, potential desire does not take into account real or actual desires of the                 
individual. This critique is well directed at “Real-freedom-for-all” because of it’s claim on discussing              
practical implementation and consequences of a UBI, but also because of the argument i rests upon.                
The argument for real freedom is that we should aim for a just society, but justice here means also                   
equality of opportunity to some degree. What this means is that justice can be considered in terms of                  
freedom and having certain rights but also in terms of fairness. As an example it can be considered                  
30 / 36 
unfair that not all people get an equal share, payed the state, of the benefits from this so choosing to                    
sell the rights to some fossil fuels located in the ground of an area that no particular individual holds                   
the right to. But this could indeed, with no infringement to the notion of freedom, happen in a just                   
society, justice being having formal freedom. From this perspective it is clear that there is a natural                 
distinction between the question of welfare and the question of freedom, although they can be linked                
as in van Parijs’ argument. But is this argument really sound? 
We have already stated one flaw (as mentioned earlier in this section), but Hunyadi and Mänz                
make another, rather striking, critique of the notion of real freedom, when they, in their separation of                 
freedom and desires, make the point that if freedom is having the capacity to do what you want to do,                    
a just policy will aim at giving everyone the means to do so, that is satisfying everyone’s welfare. The                   
core of the argument for this flaw being that desires are (to be) measured on an individual basis,                  
whilst freedom is of a more universal character, that is, most of us value freedom, but we rarely have                   
the same desire or amount of desire for a given thing. So as they write:  
 
Thus if what matters is to satisfy welfare, this kind of social justice will justify an extremely                 
unequal redistribution of resources, levels of welfare being themselves very unequal. This means             
that equal welfare can justify very unequal standards of living. (ibid:11). 
 
Such a welfare policy then sets for quite an unjust society, and indeed if we think along with van Parijs’                    
argument, such unequal distribution can in no way be considered making everyone as free as possible,                
since it favours some people. The egalitarian libertarianism in real freedom is then infringed. Van               
Parijs’ solution to this problem is his invention of potential desire, that is, the counterfactual desire                
one might have. In other words it takes into account a more universal agreement on what people, not                  
a specific individual, might want. If we focus on the possible manipulation of actual desire, which is                 
what creates the need for potential desire, is not the problem of manipulation merely moved one step                 
ahead? As Hunyadi and Mänz put it: “If desires aren’t any more manipulated [with the concept of                 
potential desire], it doesn’t mean that our representations of what we might desire, or our beliefs that                 
we can realise them, aren’t.” (ibid:12).  
 
It should be said that this critique does not limit the justification of a UBI, rather only that is questions                    
van Parijs’ conception of real freedom. To include the egalitarian principle of leximin opportunity              
indeed has it’s problems - van Parijs deal with most of them himself - but the focus here is rather on                     
the distinction between freedom and fairness, libertarianism and egalitarianism. Considering          
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compensation through a UBI as covering basic needs, yes we can call it freedom prescribing, but it                 
rests on the level of the income. If it is to cover more than just basic needs, it exceeds the borders of                      
basic needs and turns into a welfare optimizing tool of the state. Not that there is anything wrong with                   
welfare, but one can argue that even the worst off in society can be free, if basic needs are covered,                    
security established and self-ownership is possible. Van Parijs’ concept of real freedom then includes              
some egalitarian perspectives, which makes his argument for a UBI not alone an argument for justice                
but furthermore, as we have also heard from Carol Pateman, a strengthening of the individual’s               
bargaining and acting power within society. 
 
 
Humiliation in means testing 
 
This section will aim to deal with a broader understanding of a specific part of the argument for UBI.                   
The objective is to make clear the weight attributed to this point of the argument, and enlighten the                  
reader as to why van Parijs includes it. 
 
Given our previous clarification of the concept coercion we now have the tool to look specifically at an                  
important argument for the UBI; that means testing is humiliating towards the applicant. As part of                
the argument for the indiscriminate universality of a basic income van Parijs discusses why rich people                
should be given the UBI as well. In a subsection titled Better for the poor to give to the rich? he                     
includes a three-tiered argument, and we will be examining the second of these. 
 
Secondly, there is nothing humiliating about benefits given to all as a matter of citizenship.               
This cannot be said, even with the least demeaning and intrusive procedures, about benefits              
reserved for the needy, the destitute, those identified as unable to fend for themselves. From               
the standpoint of the poor, this may count as an advantage in itself, because of the lesser                 
stigma associated with a universal basic income. It also matters indirectly because of the effect               
of the stigma on the rate of take up. (van Parijs 2000:7) 
 
Clearly several presuppositions are at play here. Starting from the bottom it is noted that there is a                  
certain stigma associated with the rate of take up, implying that the higher the take up, the more the                   
stigma. This can be understood as a relationship between the rate of take up and the attitude of                  
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society towards the program and those citizens it benefits, where the lower the rate of take up is, the                   
easier it is to believe that those in the program are there with good reason. This then leads to the                    
presupposition that society generally is healthy and working as it should, which would lead to a low                 
margin for people losing their qualifications to work. Conversely, a higher rate of take up could imply                 
that more people who had previously been working, or at least were qualified for working, are now                 
unable to and in the need of benefits. This could then stimulate suspicion that opportunists would                
view the benefits program as an exploitable, because above a certain threshold for the rate of take up                  
the state might not have the resources to process every qualifying applicant to the extent where all                 
exploiters would be found out and disqualified. In turn this would reduce the amount of trust citizens                 
might feel towards each other, and this could lead to a situation where an indiscriminate stigma is                 
applied to the entire process, leaving both those that truly qualify and need the benefits in the same                  
category of possible opportunists. A category of people that, in some cases, degrade the welfare               
system and raise the standard for suspicion towards others in society. 
These complications would be made void in practice with the introduction of a UBI as a                
replacement for means testing, because without having to qualify for benefits there is no systematic               
effort to unveil, and expose to public disapproval, which citizens are in need of economic assistance                
and which are not. The stigma would, at the very least, be removed for those, that receive a state                   
sponsored grant, if everyone received such a grant. Furthermore, it is possible that whatever the               
difference between the sustainable amount affordable with means testing, securing a rate of take up               
less than 100 percent, and the sustainable amount affordable when the rate of take up is raised from                  
whatever it is was under a means testing model to 100 percent with UBI, is a good trade to make for                     
the recipients. It follows quite clearly that a higher rate of take up would reduce the highest                 
sustainable amount affordable to each recipient. That is why this subsection of van Parijs’ deals with                
reasons for giving to everyone, and thus affording by the poor to the rich the naturally given status of                   
recipient. The price equates the difference between the two affordable amounts as explained, and              
the reward equates the lessening, or complete removal, of the stigma associated with being a               
recipient. 
To illustrate the benefits more clearly, as seen from the perspective introduced, let us look at                
two specific examples within the means testing model and transfer those two subjects into a similar                
structure with a UBI model instead. The first subject is the worst conceivable case; a deserving                
applicant for the benefits program that is, for whatever reason, deemed unqualified by the process of                
means testing. This person is easily recognised as a beneficiary of transferring to a UBI model, as he or                   
she is deserving but not receiving while in a means testing structure. The second subject is a slightly                  
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more challenging case; an undeserving opportunist deemed qualified, for whatever reason. How            
could one argue that this person would benefit from transferring to a UBI model? One likely way this                  
person could benefit from transferring to a UBI would be that he or she is no longer contributing to                   
the increased burden on the stigma towards beneficiaries applied by the reality of having to deal with                 
opportunists, or rather; the perception of having to deal with people who could conceivably be               
opportunists, and whom must therefore go through a bureaucratic process to redeem themselves             
before qualifying. A somewhat peripheral benefit to an opportunist, yet none the less a benefit, as                
less stigma generally improves all circumstances for state sponsored income. 
 
Now, why would a citizen care about social stigma, and, for a poor citizen, how can we know that he                    
or she would believe the price to be worth the reward? Surely, to some, the extra resources afforded                  
by accepting scrutiny from strangers would be deemed a worthy trade. 
This is where we enter the area of the argument concerned with coercion. See, to some                
citizens the stigma has an inherent coercive element that serves to stimulate the will to qualify for                 
work, and this is where we find the very essence of the argument. The fact that some citizens remain                   
aversed to social stigma to such an extent that they believe they simply have to qualify for work                  
extending their internal perceptions of their own qualifications beyond what might be good for them,               
is directly linked to the previously discussed concepts of both freedom and coercion. Either the state                
is using means testing with knowledge of this coercion through humiliation, and thus intending to               
intimidate whatever percentage of the public existing in the grey area between clearly qualifying for               
benefits and clearly qualifying for work, into seeking employment from fear of applying to the               
category of people exposed to systemic and public scrutiny for being a beneficiary. Or the state is                 
ignorant to this process, but still receives the desired result of motivating people towards seeking               
employment, which might cause it to view means testing as successful and cost effective. A conclusion                
based on a wrongful premise, given that the state is ignorant to the real cost. Either way the structure                   
of the process contains a coercive element because it presents an applicant with an undesirable side                
effect of social stigma, and therefore the applicant will have to choose whether to value the reward                 
higher, and stay vigilant in the qualification process, or the price higher, discouraging exploiters and               
less vigilant but deserving applicants alike, in the process. 
 
The statements made in this section are recognised as empirically falsifiable, as they clearly rely on                
the assumption that the elimination process in a means testing model does include the examined               
element of coercion attaching itself to humiliation. This contains two different empirical questions; is              
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means testing in any way coercive towards the applicant, and if so, is the coercive nature humiliating?                 
If either of these questions are found to be untrue this part of the argument for a UBI would fail,                    
worsening the case for a UBI. 
 
 
Concluding remarks 
 
In short the case for a UBI is recognised by this project as being quite a strong one. There are many                     
benefits and few downsides to applying a UBI. A UBI will still face the troubles that a means testing                   
welfare model would, given that technological unemployment remains an issue for any monetarily             
based economy. But the UBI provides a stronger basis for tackling that and similar issues, because it                 
affords all people a less stressful economic environment. It cannot be viewed as anything less than                
stress relieving to have the element of working to survive taken out of the motivation to perform                 
work in the first place. 
 
However, the concept of a UBI has mostly been theoretical since its inception. It might also be a                  
problem that given the freshness of the idea of a UBI it is mainly being brought up by its supporters.                    
When the opposition to this idea has had more time, it is possible that new and stronger                 
argumentation against the UBI will arise. Additionally, given an implementation of a UBI it would               
suddenly become a much wider debate, because it would then become empirically relevant to the               
debate to notice how the project develops, and this would no doubt spark more supporters and more                 
opponents. 
 
In any case the UBI holds potential. 
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